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Taylor: Constitutional Law: Nude Dancing's Marginal Status Under the Firs

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: NUDE DANCING'S MARGINAL
STATUS UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT*
Barnes v. Glen Theater, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991)
Respondents, two nude dancing establishments, brought suit in
federal district court to enjoin enforcement of Indiana's public indecency statute. 1 The respondents alleged the statute, which required
dancers to wear pasties and a G-string, 2 infringed upon their First
Amendment rights.3 The district court, concluding nude dancing was
not expressive conduct protected under the First Amendment, upheld
the statute. 4 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding
nude dancing was expressive conduct entitled to First Amendment
protectionA The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, 6 and
HELD, that enforcement of Indiana's public indecency law to prohibit
totally nude dancing did not violate the respondents' First Amendment
rights.7

*Dedicated to my parents, Carol West and Lester D. Taylor.
1. Barnes v. Glen Theater, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456, 2458-59 (1991). Originally, the respondents
mounted an overbreadth challenge to the statute in federal district court. Id. at 2459. The
district comt granted injunctive relief, but a panel of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed and remanded after finding the Indiana Supreme Court had given the statute a limiting
construction to save it from overbreadth attack. Id. For more on the overbreadth doctrine, see
infra note 28.
2. See IND. CODE § 35-45-4-1 (1988). Indiana's public indecency law states:
(a) A person who knowingly or intentionally, in a public place:
(1) engages in sexual intercourse;
(2) engages in deviate sexual conduct;
(3) appears in a state of nudity; or
(4) fondles the genitals of himself or another person;
commits public indecency, a Class A misdemeanor.
(b) "Nudity" means the showing of the human male or female genitals, pubic area,
or buttocks with less than fully opaque covering, the showing of the female breast
with less than a fully opaque covering of any part of the nipple, or the showing
of the covered male genitals in a discernibly turgid state.
Id.
3. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2458.
4. Glen Theater, Inc. v. City of South Bend, 695 F. Supp. 414, 419 (N.D. Ind. 1988).
5. Miller v. City of South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1990) (en banc).
6. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 38.
7. Id. at 2460.
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The Supreme Court has extended First Amendment protection of
"speech" to include not only verbal communications,8 but also expressive conduct.9 If a regulation restricts expressive conduct, the Court
applies a two-tiered analysis.1° Initially, the Court determines whether
a regulation restricts conduct because of the message expressed. If
so, the regulation is deemed "content-based."' " These regulations are
subject to strict scrutiny. 12
If the regulation does not restrict conduct because of its message,
then the regulation is "content-neutral." The test used to analyze these
regulations was formulated in United States v. O'Brien.13 Under the
O'Brien test, a regulation is enforceable if: (1) It is within the power
of government; (2) it furthers a substantial governmental interest; (3)
the asserted interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression;
and (4) the incidental restriction of expressive conduct is no greater
than necessary to further the asserted interest.14 Courts have applied
the O'Brien test to a variety of laws restricting expressive conduct,
including laws prohibiting flag burning 15 and sleeping in public parks. 16
However, the Court did not apply the O'Brien test in deciding its
first case involving restrictions on nude dancing. 17 In California v.
LaRue, bar owners challenged a regulation prohibiting nude dancing
where alcohol was served.18 To bolster its defense, the state offered
evidence of sordid and illegal acts occurring in and around the estab-

8. The First Amendment reads in pertinent part: "Congress shall make no law ... abridging
the freedom of speech." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
9. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974). For expressive conduct to be protected under the First Amendment, there must be an "intent to convey a particularized message"
and there must be a "great likelihood" that the message "would be understood by those who
viewed it." Id. In the instant case, the Court did not subject nude dancing to the Spence test,
but instead accepted that such dancing was expressive conduct. See Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2460.
10.
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-2, at 789-92 (2d ed.
1988); see Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2540-41, 2543-44 (1989).
11. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2543.
12. Id. For a regulation to survive strict scrutiny, the state must show that the regulation
is "necessary to serve a compelling state interest," and is "narrowly tailored" to meet that
interest. Boos v. Barry, 109 S. Ct. 1157, 1164 (1988).
13. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2540; United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
14. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
15. See Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2533.
16. See Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984).
17. California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109 (1972).
18. Id. at 110. The California regulations prohibited the following conduct on licensed premises:
(a) The performance of acts, or simulated acts, or "sexual intercourse, masturbation,
sodomy, bestiality, oral copulation, flagellation or any sexual acts which are prohibited by law";
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lishments. 19 The Court upheld the regulation recognizing the broad
powers states have in regulating the use and distribution of alcohol
under the Twenty-First Amendment. 2°
The LaRue Court held that the regulations were within California's
21
power to control the sale and distribution of alcohol within its borders.
In LaRue, plaintiffs' customers orally copulated with female entertainers and masturbated in public.2 The Court concluded the regulations

were a rational response to problems created by mixing alcohol with
nude entertainment.? Although the Court noted that some of the
banned performances merited First Amendment protection,2 the

Court did not elaborate on this observation.2 Instead, the Court stressed the "critical fact" that the state did not prohibit such performances

"across the board," but only in places serving alcohol.? Thus, the
LaRue Court did not directly address the status of nude dancing. 27
However, the Court implied that regulations banning nude dancing

"across the board" were unconstitutional.?

(b) the actual or simulated 'touching, caressing or fondling on the breast, buttocks,
anus, or genitals";
(c) the actual or simulated "displaying of the pubic hair, anus, vulva or genitals";
(d) the permitting by a licensee of "any person to remain in or upon the licensed
premises who exposes to public view any portion of his or her genitals or anus."
Id. at 111-12.
19. Id. at 111. As described by Justice Rehnquist:
Customers were found engaging in oral copulation with women entertainers; customers engaged in public masturbation; and customers placed rolled currency either
directly into the vagina of a female entertainer, or on the bar in order that she
might pick it up herself. Numerous other forms of contact between the mouths of
male customers and the vaginal areas of female performers were reported to have
occurred.
Id.
20. Id. at 114-16, 118-19. The Twenty-First Amendment reads in pertinent part: 'The
transportation or importation into any state . . . for delivery or use therein of intoxicating
liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited." U.S. CONsT. amend. XXI, § 2.
The Court has interpreted this language to give the states broad powers to regulate the sale
and distribution of alcohol. See LaRue, 409 U.S. at 114 (noting that "the broad sweep of the
Twenty-First Amendment has been recognized as conferring something more than the normal
state authority over public health, welfare, and morals").
21. LaRue, 409 U.S. at 118-19.
22. See supra note 19.
23. LaRue, 409 U.S. at 115-16.
24. Id. at 118.
25. See id.
26. Id.
27. See id.
28. See id. As noted earlier, the Court did not have to rule on an overbreadth challenge
in the instant case. See supra note 1. The overbreadth doctrine, however, is an important part
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The Court sidestepped the issue again in Doran v. Salem Inn,
Inc.29 In Salem, bar operators challenged a town ordinance prohibiting
topless dancing3 ° Unlike the regulations in LaRue, the Salem ordinance prohibited such dancing in all public places, not just establishments serving liquor.31 However, the issue in Salem was not specifically whether the First Amendment protects nude dancing32 Instead,
the case involved procedural questions.3 Therefore, the Court did not
apply the O'Brien test.3 Yet, in dicta, the Court once again implied
that nude dancing enjoyed some First Amendment protection.3
In Salem, the Court reviewed the district court's grant of injunctive
relief to the bar owners.3 6 The Court commented that although barroom-type nude dancing may involve only the "barest minimum" of

expression, "this form of entertainment might be entitled to First and
Fourteenth Amendment protection under some circumstances."-3 The
Court further noted the challenged ordinance was not tied to alcohol.-

of the Court's First Amendment jurisprudence. In effect, the overbreadth doctrine creates an
exception to the rules of standing in the area of the First Amendment. Broadrick v. Oklahoma,
413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973). The Court has allowed parties to attack overly broad statutes in court
even though the litigants' rights of free expression have not been violated. Id. This is because
the Court fears that overly broad statutes may cause others not before the Court to refrain
from constitutionally protected speech. Id. Under this doctrine, a law is void if on its face it
"does not aim specifically at evils within the allowable area of [government] control, but . . .
sweeps within its ambit other activities that constitute an exercise" of protected speech. Thornhill
v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97 (1940) (general statement of the overbreadth doctrine). The Court
has cautioned, however, that facial overbreadth may not be invoked when a limiting construction
has been or could be placed on the statute. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613. The Indiana Supreme
Court appeared to provide such a limiting construction for the indecency law at issue. See supra
note 1; infra note 71. For more on the overbreadth doctrine and its evolution, see TRIBE, supra
note 10, § 12-27.
29. 422 U.S. 922 (1975).
30. Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 924 (1975).
31. Id. at 933.
32. See id. at 927-32.
33. See id. The Court had to decide whether the plaintiffs were barred, under procedural
rules, from seeking declaratory relief. Id. Only at the end of the opinion, when reviewing the
district court's grant of a preliminary injunction, did the Court pass on the issue of nude dancing's
protection under the First Amendment. Id. Because the Court was evaluating the grant of
relief under the standard for such relief (i.e., whether the plaintiffs' had made a showing of
likely success on the merits), its discussion is not conclusive on the issue of nude dancing's
protection under the First Amendment. See id. at 933.
34. See id.
35. Id. at 932.
36. Id. at 931-32.
37. Id. at 932.
38. Id. at 932-33.
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Therefore, the state's broad powers under the Twenty-First Amendment were not implicated.3 9 Accordingly, the Court upheld the district
court's decision to grant the bar owners injunctive relief. 40 As in
LaRue, the Court implied that nude dancing enjoyed some First
4
Amendment protection. 1

This implication gained greater force in Schad v. Borough of Mount
Ephraim.4 In Schad, the owners of an adult bookstore violated a
zoning ordinance prohibiting all live entertainment in the city's com-

mercial zone.4 3 The bookstore had coin-operated booths allowing viewers to see a live nude dancer performing behind a glass panel.- In a

plurality opinion, 45 the Court agreed with the defendant's overbreadth
challenge and struck down the ordinance.46
The authority for the Schad ordinance rested upon the city's zoning
power.47 As a result, the Court focused its discussion on the city's use

of zoning authority. 8 The Court concluded that while states do possess
broad zoning powers, the city could not justify such a broad restriction
of protected activity. 49 Throughout the opinion, the Court emphasized
that a ban on all live entertainment prohibited a variety of protected
speech. 0 Because of the ordinance's broad sweep in Schad, the Court

39.
40.
41.
42.

Id.
Id. at 933.
See id. at 932; LaRue, 409 U.S. at 118.
452 U.S. 61 (1981).
43. Id. at 65; see MOUNT EPHRAIM, N.J., CODE § 99-15B(1)-(2) (1979) (quoted in Schad,
452 U.S. at 63). New Jersey courts had interpreted this ordinance as banning all live entertainment, and the Court accepted this as binding upon it for the purposes of its decision. Schad,

452 U.S. at 63.
44. Schad, 452 U.S. at 62.
45. Id. at 61. Justice White delivered the Court's opinion. Id. Justices Blackmun, Powell,
and Stevens filed separate concurring opinions. Id. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist
dissented. Id.
46. Id. For more on the overbreadth doctrine, see supra note 28.
47. See Schad, 452 U.S. at 68-74.
48. Therefore, the Court did not apply the O'Brien test, although it did evaluate the
ordinance under the 'time, place, manner" test. Id. at 74-76. Under the "time, place, manner"
test, a regulation is valid if it: is justified without reference to the content of the regulated
speech; is narrowly tailored to serve a substantial governmental interest; and leaves open ample
alternative channels of communication. Clark, 468 U.S. at 293. In Clark, the Court stated that
O'Brien's four-pronged test was "little, if any, different from the standard applied to time, place
or manner restrictions." Id. at 298.
49. Schad, 452 U.S. at 72. The Court argued that when a zoning ordinance impinges upon
a protected liberty, "it must be narrowly drawn and must further a sufficiently substantial
governmental interest." Id. at 68. The zoning ordinance at issue failed both prongs of this test.
See id.at 72-74.
50. See id. at 65, 66, 73.
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did not analyze the finer issue of nude dancing's protection under the
First Amendment.51 Yet the Court, citing Doran and LaRue, noted,
in dicta, that "nude dancing is not without its First Amendment protections from official regulation."52
In the instant case, the Court finally confronted nude dancing's
protection under the First Amendment.- Chief Justice Rehnquist,
writing for a plurality of the Court, acknowledged the language of
LaRue, Doran, and Schad but stated that nude dancing was expression
only "marginally" within the "outer perimeters" of the First Amendment. However, by recognizing that First Amendment expression
was implicated, the Court was required to apply the O'Brien test.a
After applying O'Brien's four-step inquiry,5 6 the Court found the statute constitutional. 57
Addressing the first two prongs, the Court recognized that public
indecency laws have long been justified as part of a state's police
powers.- In addition, these laws reflected a substantial governmental
interest in protecting order and morality. 59 Reaching the third prong,
the Court found the government interest unrelated to any message
expressed by nude dancing.- In doing so, the Court separated eroti-

51. See id. at 65.
52. Id. at 66.
53. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2460.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 2460-61. In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia cbntended the O'Brien test does
not apply to cases such as the instant case. See id. at 2463, 2466. For Justice Scalia, the pertinent
inquiry is whether the purpose of the law is to suppress expression. Id. at 2467. If the Court
answers this question affirmatively, then the Court must determine whether the state has a
substantial justification for the proscription. Id. If the law does not intend to suppress expression,
then that is the end of any First Amendment inquiry for the Court. Id. Scalia's argument here
repeated his earlier argument as an appeals court judge in Community for Creative Non-Violence
v. Watt, 703 F.2d 586, 622-23 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (en banc), rev'd 468 U.S. 288 (1984). In the
instant case, Scalia contended that Indiana's indecency statute did not intend to suppress expression, and therefore, no further First Amendment inquiry under O'Brien was necessary. Barnes,
111 S. Ct. at 2465-67.
56. See text accompanying supra note 14.
57. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2461-63.
58. Id. at 2461. The plurality noted that public indecency laws in Indiana dated back to
1831 and thereby pre-dated barroom-type nude dancing. Id.
59. Id. at 2462. The plurality cited its decisions in Paris Adult Theater I v. Slanton, 413
U.S. 49 (1973) (upholding law prohibiting the showing of obscene films) and Bowers v. Hardwick,
478 U.S. 186 (1986) (upholding law prohibiting sodomy) as precedent for the notion that public
morality may serve as a basis Jor law. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2462.
60. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2462.
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61
cism, the message of nude dancing, from the nude dancing itself.

The Court emphasized that Indiana had not prohibited the message
of eroticism, just its transmission through nude dancing.62 By requiring
dancers to wear pasties and a G-string, Indiana had only made the
message "slightly less graphic." 3 These restrictions, moreover, were
no greater than necessary to further Indiana's substantial governmental interest. 64
In a concurring opinion, Justice Souter argued that the "secondary
effects" of nude dancing validated the statute. 65 Although not addressed by the plurality, Souter accepted the state's argument that nude
dancing encouraged prostitution, sexual assaults, and other criminal
activity.6 Aside from any moral justification, Souter believed the state
had a substantial interest in preventing such crime6 7 Moreover, this
interest was unrelated to the eroticism expressed by nude dancers.64
than
Finally, the statute's restriction of expression was no greater
69
crime.
preventing
in
interest
state's
the
further
to
necessary
Writing for the dissent, Justice White criticized the plurality's
characterization of the statute as content-neutral.7 ° The dissent noted
that the Indiana Supreme Court narrowed the law so as not to prohibit
nudity as part of "some larger form of expression meriting protection."' In fact, the state admitted the evils addressed by the statute

61. Id. "While the dancing to which [the indecency statute] was applied had a communicative
element, it was not the dancing that was prohibited, but simply its being done in the nude." Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 2468. The Court first approved of the "secondary effects" argument in Renton
v. Playtime Theaters, 475 U.S. 41 (1986). In Renton, the Court upheld a municipal zoning
ordinance regulating the location of adult entertainment establishments. Renton, 475 U.S. at
53. The interests asserted by the city were the prevention of the crime and urban decay - the
"secondary effects" - that often follow adult entertainment businesses into neighborhoods. Id.
at 47-48. Accepting this as a substantial interest unrelated to expression, the Court upheld the
ordinance under an O'Brien analysis. See id. at 43-55.
66. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2469.
67. Id. at 2468-69.
68. Id. at 2470 ("on its face, the governmental interest in combating prostitution and other
criminal activity is not at all inherently related to expression").
69. Id. at 2471.
70. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2473-75 (Justice White termed the plurality's third-prong reasoning
"transparently erroneous").
71. Id. The Indiana Supreme Court narrowed the construction and application of the public
indecency statute in State v. Baysinger, 397 N.E.2d 580, 587 (Ind. 1979). The plurality mentions
Baysinger and its apparent effect on the statute in a footnote, but does not discuss this point
in the text of its opinion. See Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2459 n.1.
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were not implicated when nudity occurs in a theatrical production of
72 According
Salome or Hair.
to the dissent, the state drew lines between permissible and impermissible nudity. 73 In this manner, Indiana's statute was an attempt to prohibit eroticism.7 4 Accordingly,
the statute was content-based and should have been subjected to strict
scrutiny.75 Since the statute banned an entire category of expression,
the dissent argued the statute was not narrowly tailored and was
therefore unconstitutional.76
The instant court's decision undermined its earlier dicta in LaRue,
Doran, and Schad. 77 In those decisions, the Court implied that nude
dancing enjoyed some protection under the First Amendment.78 However, the broad sweep of Indiana's indecency statute drastically limited
the potential forums for nude dancing.7 Unlike the ordinance in
LaRue,- the Indiana statute was not tied to the sale of alcohol and
the state's Twenty-First Amendment powers."' Consequently, states
may prohibit totally nude dancing in any "public place."- Under this
decision, the private home remains the only protected forum for nude
dancing.8

72. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2473.
73. Id.
74. See id. at 2474. Justice White complained that the plurality could not "pigeonhole" the
nudity element of nude dancing as independent of the expressive component of nude dancing.
Id. Justice White argued that "the nudity of the (lancer isan integral part of the emotions and
thoughts that a nude dancing performance evokes." Id. (citing Miller, 904 F.2d at 1090-98
(Posner, J., concurring)). Justice White then reasoned that: "Since the state permits the dancers
to perform if they wear pasties and G-strings but forbids nude dancing, it is precisely because
of the distinctive, expressive content of the nude dancing performance at issue in this case that
the state seeks to apply the statutory prohibition." Id.
75. Id. For a definition of the strict-scrutiny standard, see supra note 12.
76.

Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2475.

77. See Schad, 452 U.S. at 66; Doran, 422 U.S. at 932; LaRue, 409 U.S. at 118.
78. See Schad, 452 U.S. at 66; Doran, 422 U.S. at 932; LaRue, 409 U.S. at 118.
79.
80.
81.
82.

See IND. CODE § 35-45-4-1 (1988).
See LaRue, 409 U.S. at 118-19.
See IND. CODE § 35-45-4-1 (1988).
See IND. CODE § 35-45-4-1 (1988). The Court did not have to decide whether the Kitty

Kat Lounge and Glen Theater were "public places" within the meaning of the statute. The
respondents conceded this point on appeal to the Seventh Circuit. Miller, 904 F.2d at 1082.
The Indiana Supreme Court has defined a public place as "any place where the public is invited
and are free to go upon special or implied invitation - a place available to all or a certain
segment of the public." State v. Baysinger, 397 N.E.2d at 583. Indiana's definition of a "public
place" and its application in the instant case is supported by Paris Adult Theater I v. Slanton,
413 U.S. 49, 65-67 (1973) (noting "conduct ...that the state police power can prohibit on a
public street do[es] not become automatically protected by the Constitution merely because the
conduct is moved into a bar or a 'live' theater stage ....). ParisAdult Theater I, 413 U.S. at 67.
83. See Barnes, 111 S.Ct. at 2476 (White, J., dissenting); supra note 82.
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In reaching its decision, the plurality focused on the third prong
of O'Brien's four-pronged test.8 This prong requires the regulation to
be unrelated to the suppression of expression. 5 Under this requirement, the Court must be able to separate an actor's message from
the regulated conduct.86 Though the plurality distinguished nudity from
eroticism, it conceded that requiring pasties and a G-string would
make the erotic message "less graphic."8 7 This concession, however,
implicitly acknowledged that nudity was, to a certain extent, inextri-

cable from the nude dancers' message.as Indeed, Justice White in his
dissent argued that nudity was an integral part of the message of
nude dancing.8 9 The plurality's concession and the dissent's criticism
indicate the difficulty in distinguishing conduct from message under

O'Brien's third prong.

°

Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2460-63.
Id. at 2462-63. Professor Ely characterizes the inquiry under O'Brien's third prong as:
Whether the harm that the state is seeking to avert is one that grows out of the
fact that the defendant is communicating, and more particularly out of the way
people can be expected to react to his message, or rather would arise even if the
defendant's conduct had no communicative significance.
John Hart Ely, Flag Desecration:A Case Study in the Roles of Categorizationand Balancing
in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1497 (1975). See generally David S.
Day, The IncidentalRegulation of FreeSpeech, 42 MIAmI L. REV. 491, 506-25 (1988) (discussing
the evolution of the O'Brien test in Supreme Court cases).
86. See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376-77; Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2463.
87. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2463.
88. See id. at 2474 (White, J., dissenting).
89. Id. (citing Miller, 904 F.2d at 1090-98) (Posner, J., concurring). In his Miller concurrence, Judge Posner commented that:
Nudity is the usual state in which sexual intercourse is conducted in our culture
The goal of the striptease - a goal to which the dancing is indispensible .
is to enforce the association; to make plain that the performer is not removing her
clothes because she is about to take a bath . . . [but] to insinuate that she is
preparing for, thinking about, and desiring sex.
Miller, 904 F.2d at 1091.
90. Professor Ely, for one, does not think courts can make an honest distinction between
conduct and message when evaluating acts of expressive conduct. The two elements are so
intertwined, that one who attempts to separate them engages in an "ontological fallacy." Ely,
supra note 85, at 1493-96; see also Melville B. Nimmer, The Meaning of Symbolic Speech Under
the FirstAmendment, 21 UCLA L. REV. 29, 33 (1973) (arguing that any attempt to separate
"speech" from conduct which is itself expressive "will not withstand analysis"); TRIBE, supra
note 10, § 12-17, at 827 (noting that expression and conduct are often 'inextricably tied together"
and the difficulty the Court has had in distinguishing between the two in cases); Martin H.
Redish, The Content Distinction in FirstAmendment Analysis, 34 STAN. L. REV. 113, 113-14
(1981) (labeling the content distinction "theoretically questionable" and arguing for a "unitary.
mode" of judicial review of all governmental regulation of expression).
84.
85.
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Moreover, the plurality ignored Indiana's selective enforcement of
the indecency law. 91 As the dissent noted, the state admitted that the
statute was not implicated by nudity in legitimate theatrical productions.92 Likewise, the Indiana Supreme Court apparently narrowed
the statute to apply only when nudity was not part of "some larger
form of expression meriting protection." 93 Thus, Indiana invoked the
statute to prohibit nudity in barroom-type dancing, but left nudity in
theatrical productions unrestricted. This selective prohibition of nudity
in entertainment belies the plurality's argument that the interests
underlying the statute were unrelated to the message expressed by
nude dancing.94
In contrast, Souter's analysis was less problematic. In his concurrence, Souter accepted the state's "secondary effects" argument in
support of the indecency statute. 95 Preventing prostitution and sexual
assault - the alleged "secondary effects" of nude dancing - were
substantial interests unrelated to the message of eroticism.9 Thus,
the correlation between nude dancing and crime justified selective
enforcement. Further, Souter's reasoning did not rely on the dubious
argument that the nudity in nude dancing was unprotected because
it was not part of some "larger form of expression meriting protection. '97 Yet, no other Justice subscribed to Souter's opinion.- This
may reflect the Court's hesitancy to extend "secondary effects"
analysis beyond zoning cases. 99
On another level, the plurality's reasoning demonstrates a weakening of the O'Brien test and its protection of expressive conduct. 1'0
91. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2472 (White, J., dissenting).
92. Id. at 2473.
93. Id. at 2459 n.1.
94. See id. at 2474 (White, J., dissenting).
95. Id. at 2469 (Souter, J., concurring). Justice Souter appeared uneasy with the argument
that a governmental interest in protecting public morality could justify the application of the
indecency statute in the instant, case. Justice Souter stated: "I ... write separately to rest my
concurrence in the judgment, not on the possible sufficiency of society's moral views to justify
the limitations at issue, but on the State's substantial interest in combating the secondary
effects of adult entertainment establishments .... ." Id. at 2468-69 (emphasis added). This
unease could explain why Justice Souter fastened on to the "secondary effects" rationale while
the other Justices of the plurality ignored this particular argument.
96. Id. at 2470-71; see supra note 65.
97. See Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2469.
98. See id. at 2468.
99. See supra note 65. Professor Tribe comments that Renton and its "secondary effects"
argument may be an aberration in the Court's First Amendment jurisprudence. TRIBE, supra
note 10.
100. Professor Day argues that since its formulation, the O'Brien test has been weakened
in subsequent applications by the Court. See Day, supra note 85, at 506-30.
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CASE COMMENTS

O'Brien's third prong is the threshold inquiry.101 This prong prohibits

states from suppressing expression through laws purporting to restrict
only conduct. 10 2 However, the plurality's willingness to label Indiana's
public indecency statute "content-neutral" significantly weakens this
prong. 0 3 Since the unrelatedness prong is the distinguishing characteristic of the O'Brien test, 1°4 the plurality's reasoning reduces the
O'Brien test's protection of expressive conduct.
Thus, the instant case could affect expression beyond the realm of
nude dancing and adult entertainment. On its face, the Court's decision
gives states greater power to regulate or even prohibit nude dancing
in commercial establishments. By limiting the dancers' access to an
audience, the Court greatly restricted nude dancing's First Amendment protection.505 While clearly a blow to red-light districts, the
Court's analysis may also signal a disturbing weakening of the protection afforded to expressive conduct in general.106 The instant Court's
treatment of O'Brien's unrelatedness prong presents states with a less
demanding hurdle. 0 7 Ultimately, this means government will have a
freer hand to regulate expressive conduct through ordinances which
are merely content-neutral on their face.
James H. Taylor

101. See Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2541; Day, supra note 85, at 527.
102. See Young, 427 U.S. at 81 n.4 (Powell, J., concurring); Day, supra note 85, at 505, 527.
103. Professor Day contends the Court has diluted the unrelatedness prong through earlier
decisions and thereby has "drastically mitigated the level of protection afforded by the [O'Brien]
test." Day, supra note 85, at 519.
104. Commentators have noted the salience of the unrelatedness prong of the O'Brien test.
See id. at 508, 527; Ely, supra note 85, at 1484, 1496.
105. See text accompanying supra notes 78-83.

106. See text accompanying supra note 101; Day, supra note 85, at 506-30.
107.

See text accompanying supra note 103; Day, supra note 85, at 519.
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